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One Size Does Not Fit All: The Need for a
Complete Abolition of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences for Juveniles in
Response to Roper, Graham, and Miller
Lindsey E. Krauset
I. Introduction
Juvenile sentencing practices in the United States have seen
a tremendous amount of reform in the past decade.1 The United
States Supreme Court created a foundation for such reform with a
trilogy of cases: Miller v. Alabama, Graham v. Florida, and Roper
v. Simmons.2 Beginning with Roper in 2005, the Supreme Court
held that the death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for
juveniles under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 Next,
with Graham in 2010, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment also prohibits the imposition of life without parole
(LWOP) sentences on juvenile offenders who did not commit
homicide.4 Finally, with Miller in 2012, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for
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1. Shobha L. Mahadev, Youth Matters: Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and the
New Juvenile Jurisprudence, 38-MAR CHAMPION 14, 14 (2014) ("The last decade
has given rise to an unprecedented series of decisions that relies upon common
sense, science, and social science to require that youth be considered differently
than adults in criminal procedure and sentencing matters.").
2. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. 543 U.S. at 574 ("The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at
which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.").
4. 560 U.S. at 74 (asserting that this conclusion "is necessary to prevent the
possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile
nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that
punishment").
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juvenile homicide offenders.! Each case emphasized psychological
and cognitive characteristics that separate adult offenders from
juvenile ones.' The Court determined that children have "a lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.., are
more vulnerable.., to negative influences and outside
pressures... [and] they have limited control over their own
environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from
horrific, crime-producing settings."7 The Court relied not only on
"common sense" to reach this conclusion, but on science and social
science as well.8 Roper, Graham, and Miller built upon each other
to ultimately showcase the importance of providing courts with
discretionary power to individually assess juvenile offenders
during the sentencing process because of the inherent differences
between youth and adults.' Each holding "flow[ed] from the basic
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to both the offender and the offense."1
What is the best application of these cases? How do we best
take into account the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders?
Several courts interpreted the standards set forth in Roper,
Graham, and Miller, resulting in divergent applications." It can
5. 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
6. Id. at 2468 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, and Graham, 560 U.S. at 67)
("[These cases] teach that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer
misses too much if he treats every child as an adult. . . . Mandatory life without
parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its
hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences.").
7. Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
8. The Court does not define "common sense" beyond reiterating that its
findings were "what 'any parent knows."' Id. at 2464. In addition to this "common
sense" justification, the Court cites several empirical studies to reinforce their
conclusion that children are fundamentally different from adults. Roper, 543 U.S.
at 570.
9. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 ("[Treating children as adults] prevents taking
into account the family and home environment that surrounds him .... Indeed, it
ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for
incompetencies associated with youth ... ").
10. Id. at 2463 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560).
11. See Goins v. Smith, 556 Fed. Appx. 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that,
while the language in Miller "certainly counsels in favor of considering juveniles'
diminished culpability in imposing consecutive term-of-years sentences,... [it]
does not clearly require such an approach where a juvenile faces an aggregate
term-of-years sentence"); U.S. v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Much
less does a five-year sentence equate to one of 'the law's most serious punishments'
so as to raise the constitutional concerns identified in Miller v. Alabama about the
mandatory application of life without parole to all juveniles.") (internal quotations
omitted); Silva v. McDonald, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
("Notwithstanding the holdings in Roper, Graham, or Miller, this Court is not
aware of any controlling Supreme Court precedent which holds ... that the
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be argued, however, that the most accurate interpretation of this
evolving standard is found in the Iowa Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Lyle.12  State v. Lyle paves the way for complete
individualization of juvenile sentencing, a practice essential to
preserving the rights of youth." The first decision of its kind," the
Court in Lyle concluded that any mandatory minimum sentence of
imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment when given to a
juvenile defendant.15 The Court credited its revolutionary decision
to a combined interpretation of Roper, Graham, and Miller." The
Iowa Court demonstrates an understanding of the harsh realities
facing many juveniles in the criminal system, and understands
that these realities, coupled with the range in developmental
abilities of juvenile offenders, require the court to examine each
juvenile on a case-by-case basis. 7
States' sentencing practices should conform to Iowa's
interpretation of the Roper, Graham, and Miller Supreme Court
trilogy. A complete individualization of sentencing practices for
juveniles is the best way to adequately protect the rights of
juveniles in light of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, our
modern understanding of juvenile culpability, and the struggles
faced by juveniles in the criminal justice system. Other states
sentence at issue here of 40-years-to-life with the possibility of parole, for a
juvenile ... violates the Eighth Amendment."); cf State v. Smoot, 134 So.3d 1, 10
(La. Ct. App. 2014) ("The trial court stated that it had taken into account the youth
of defendant as well as his upbringing and previous criminal activity."); Foye v.
State, 153 So.3d 854, 863 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) ("We hold that a sentencing
hearing for a juvenile convicted of a capital offense must now include consideration
of... the juvenile's chronological age at the time of the offense and the hallmark
features of youth ....").
12. 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014).
13. Id.
14. Iowa: Mandatory Minimums for Juveniles Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/201407/19/us/iowa-mandatory-mini
mums-for-juveniles-thrown-out.html?_r=0.
15. 854 N.W.2d at 402 ("Miller is properly read to support a new sentencing
framework that reconsiders mandatory sentencing for all children. Mandatory
minimum sentencing results in cruel and unusual punishment due to the
differences between children and adults.").
16. Id. at 401 ("Overall, no other logical result can be reached under article I,
section 17 [of the Iowa Constitution], a result that is also embedded within the
most recent cases from the United States Supreme Court."). The Court interprets
article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution identically, citing precedent interpreting the respective
provisions interchangeably. See id. at 402.
17. Id. at 402-03 ("The keystone of our reasoning is that youth and its
attendant circumstances and attributes make a broad statutory declaration




should follow Iowa's lead, doing away with mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles completely and, in turn, applying the
individualization mandate in Miller as an alternative.
This Comment begins by providing a brief overview of the
evolution of juvenile justice practices in the United States,
touching briefly on the creation of juvenile court but focusing
mainly on the expanding presence of juveniles in adult criminal
court. The next section will provide more detail on the
aforementioned United States Supreme Court trilogy and examine
the effects these cases have on modern juvenile sentencing
practices. Third, this Comment will look specifically at Iowa's
implementation of Roper, Graham, and Miller and will analyze the
Lyle decision in depth. The fourth and final section will explain
how the decision in Lyle is an appropriate interpretation of Roper,
Graham, and Miller based on recent evidence regarding the
limited culpability of juveniles, the particular struggles of juvenile
offenders in the adult criminal system, and subsequent evolving
jurisprudence. This section will also advocate for a complete
abolishment of all mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders in
light of the Lyle decision and provide a recommendation of factors
a court should consider when creating an individualized sentence.
II. The Historical Evolution of Juvenile Justice Practices in
the United States
In order to recognize the significance of the Lyle decision, it is
important to provide a historical overview of the treatment of
juveniles under the law. As the court in Lyle points out: "This
history is particularly salient given the categorical nature of Lyle's
challenge. It reveals children and juveniles have been viewed as
constitutionally different from adults in this country for more than
a century."18  This history, combined with today's psychological
and scientific understanding of juvenile culpability, creates a
supportive context in which to fit a widespread abolition of
mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles.
A. The Development of Juvenile Justice
At common law, young children under the age of seven lacked
criminal capacity and children between the ages of seven and
fourteen were presumed to lack criminal capacity."1 Juveniles over
the age of fourteen, however, were presumed to have the requisite
18. Id. at 390.
19. Id.
[Vol. 33: 481
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capacity to commit criminal actions.20 For more than 100 years
after the founding of the United States, prosecuted juveniles were
tried in adult criminal court.21  Prior to the creation of juvenile
courts, states tried and sentenced children as adults, and
"imprisoned and executed them for crimes committed as young as
ten, eleven, or twelve years of age. 22
As America began to industrialize, a more modern view of
juveniles came to fruition. Progressive reformers were "appalled
by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children
could be given long prison sentences and [be] mixed in jails with
hardened criminals. 24 With this disgust, reformers advocated for
the creation of a separate criminal system "concerned with
determining what was in the child's best interests based upon the
child's unique circumstances. 25  The focus of this new juvenile
court was to be on rehabilitation and treatment rather than
punishment.2' The court was to act in parens patriae, as surrogate
parents for children.27 While, in theory, this meant protection for
children, it often meant that juveniles did not receive the rights of
criminal defendants in the adult system.28
As society's perceptions on the importance of liberty and due
process for juveniles began to shift in the middle of the twentieth
century, the Court began to require the basic protection provided
to adult offenders to be offered in both juvenile courts and in
proceedings in which juveniles were waived into adult court. 21
20. Id.
21. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal
Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 13 (2007).
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id. at 14-15.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
25. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 390 (Iowa 2014) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.
at 15-16).
26. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 108 (1909)
("[T]he protection is accomplished by suspending sentence and releasing the child
under probation, or in the case of removal from the home, sending it to a school
instead of to a jail or penitentiary.").
27. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 390-91 (referencing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-17); see
Marvin Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children's Law
and Practice, 32-JAN COLO. LAW. 65 (2003) ("The courts accepted the logic that
society was entitled to take custody of a child without due process of law, ...
because of the state's authority and obligation to save its children from becoming
criminal.").
28. The common opinion of the time was that a child had no individual right to
liberty, only a right to custody. Thus, it was understood that the state could not
deprive a child of any rights because he had none. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 390 (citing
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-17).
29. For example, in Gault, the Court conceded that the juvenile court had
2015]
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States did not react to the Court's decision by reforming their
juvenile courts; rather, the response was often for state
legislatures to prosecute more juveniles as adults and to give more
juveniles adult sentences." While transfer from juvenile to adult
criminal court has been an option since the inception of the
juvenile court, states in the mid- to late-twentieth century began
dramatically expanding the offenses for which transfer could be
permitted.31 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, states lowered the
age for transfer and narrowed juvenile court jurisdiction, with
many states enacting mandatory transfer provisions for serious
offenses. 2 This rapid increase in transfer from the juvenile to the
adult criminal system and the increase in harsh sentencing
statutes led to longer, more intense sentences for juveniles."
These policies were propelled by a rhetorical "narrative of a young
generation of 'super-predators' and predictions of an impending
blood-bath of youth violence." 4
By the end of the twentieth century, the Court recognized the
harsh treatment of juveniles as an issue needing to be addressed."
At the crux of this realization was the need to create standards for
juvenile sentencing that complied with the Eighth Amendment,"
specifically the cruel and unusual punishment clause. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in several decisions, did recognize substantial
differences between juveniles and adults that supported
differential treatment. 7
benevolent motives; however, the unbridled discretion of the courts to create
sentences for juveniles in their so-called "best interest" without a set of fair process
and procedure violated the constitutional rights of those juveniles. 387 U.S. at 17-
18.
30. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 391 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57
(1966)); Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System,
27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 84 (2000).
31. Bishop, supra note 30, at 84-85; see also Shuka Rassouli, Cruel and
Unusual Punishment: Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Adult Prisons, 8 WHITTIER J.
CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 261 (2009) (providing a history of juveniles in the adult
court system).
32. Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW
& INEQ. 263, 267 (2013).
33. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 391.
34. Feld, supra note 32, at 266-67 (concluding that the intersection of youth,
race, and crime fueled punitive policies).
35. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 391.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
37. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 391; see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-38 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982).
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III. The Creation of Modern Juvenile Sentencing Reform:
The Supreme Court Trilogy
The Supreme Court decided three revolutionary juvenile
sentencing cases in relatively quick succession, creating an
expanded interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and
unusual punishment clause."
A. Treating Youth Categorically: Roper
Simmons, a 17-year-old junior in high school, planned and
committed capital murder.9 Approximately nine months later, as
an 18-year-old, he was tried as an adult.0 The State sought the
death penalty, presenting several aggravating factors.41  The
defense focused on Simmons' lack of prior convictions and his
capacity to care for and love his younger brothers and his
grandmother. 2  Both the prosecutor and defense counsel
addressed Simmons' age. Simmons' counsel argued that someone
Simmons' age "cannot drink, serve on juries, or even see certain
movies" because states recognize the lack of responsibility of
youth. The prosecutor rebutted, emphasizing that it is
disturbing for someone that young to commit such a crime and
that age should not mitigate the sentence.45 The trial judge, under
the jury's recommendation, sentenced Simmons to death.
Simmons obtained new counsel and moved to set aside the
conviction and sentence. 7 Simmons' counsel argued that he was
"very immature, very impulsive, and very susceptible to being
manipulated or influenced" and that these matters should have
been established in the sentencing proceeding." The trial court
38. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
39. Because Simmons was seventeen at the time of his crime, he was outside
the jurisdiction of Missouri's juvenile court. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (citing Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 211.021 (2000) and 211.031 (Supp. 2003)).
40. Id. at 557.
41. The State submitted the following factors: "[The crime] was committed for
the purpose of receiving money; was committed for the purpose of
avoiding.., lawful arrest of defendant; and involved depravity of mind .... Id.






48. Id. at 559 (internal quotations omitted).
2015]
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denied the motion for post-conviction relief and the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed.49
In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the death
penalty for a mentally retarded person." Simmons filed a new
petition, arguing that the reasoning used in Atkins established a
similar prohibition for juvenile offenders under the age of
eighteen." The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with this
contention, setting aside Simmons' death sentence and
resentencing him to life without parole. 2 The State appealed and
the United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari."
The Court recognized the national consensus against the
death penalty for juveniles, as the Missouri Supreme Court did.14
The Court identified three differences between juveniles under
eighteen and adults to demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot
be classified among the worst offenders that warrant the death
penalty:" (1) juveniles do not possess the same sense of
responsibility or level of maturity that adults do;" (2) juveniles are
more susceptible to "negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure"; 7 and (3) the character and personality of
a juvenile is not developed to the same extent as that of an adult.8
Taking these factors into account, along with both the national
consensus and international consensus against the death
penalty, 9 the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court and
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments "forbid
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
49. Id. (citing State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (en banc)). The federal
courts also denied Simmons' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Simmons v.
Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 2001).
50. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
51. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 560 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004)); see also Brief for
Petitioner at 41, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
903158.
54. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 ("30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty,
comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that
maintain it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles
from its reach.").
55. Id. at 569.
56. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
57. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
58. Id. at 570.
59. Id. at 578 ("The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.").
[Vol. 33: 481
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age of 18 when their crimes were committed."0  The Court
recognized the reality that there are always exceptions to
categorical rules; 1 however, the Court reiterated the necessity of
drawing a line between childhood and adulthood for the
aforementioned reasons and chose the age most commonly used in
society.1
2
B. Extending the Categorical Treatment of Youth: Graham
Graham, a 16-year-old, was arrested for attempted robbery. 3
Under Florida law, a prosecutor has discretion to charge a 16-
year-old as an adult or as a juvenile for most felony crimes. 4
Graham's prosecutor elected to charge Graham as an adult.
5
Graham pleaded guilty to both charges under a plea agreement,
which the trial court accepted. Graham was to spend the first
twelve months of his sentence on probation."' He received credit
for the time he had served awaiting trial and was released on June
25, 2004.8
Less than six months later, Graham was again arrested in
connection with a home invasion robbery and admitted to being
involved in two or three other previous crimes. The trial court
found Graham guilty of the earlier armed burglary and attempted
armed robbery charges, sentencing him as an adult to LWOP.7 °
Graham challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment
and the First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 1 After the Florida Supreme Court
60. Id.
61. Id. at 574 ("The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.").
62. Id. ("The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood.").
63. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010).
64. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1)(b) (2003) (subsequently renumbered at §
985.557(1)(b) (2007))).
65. Id. at 53-54 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 810.02(1)(b), (2)(a), § 812.13(2)(b), §§
777.04(1), 4(a), and § 775.082(3)(c) (2003)) (Graham was charged with "armed
burglary with assault or battery, a first-degree felony ... and attempted armed
robbery, a second-degree felony ... .
66. Id. at 54.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 55.
70. Id. at 57.
71. Id. at 58 (citing Graham v. Florida, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
2015]
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denied review, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari."2
In Graham, the Supreme Court utilized reasoning similar to
that in Roper.3 While the Court did not find a consensus among
state laws, the Court did find a consensus among actual state
sentencing practices against using LWOP sentences for juveniles.4
The Court asserted that the eventual determination must be based
upon a reading of the Eighth Amendment and that public
consensus, while valid, does not provide the sole criterion."
The Supreme Court decision in Graham, as in the Roper
decision, acknowledged that the differences between juveniles and
adults must be taken into account when developing sentencing
guidelines for youth." The Court was led to conclude, "[a] juvenile
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished
moral culpability."" Based on this understanding, the Court
finally concluded that LWOP sentences are overly harsh for
juveniles."8 None of the established penological justifications, the
Court determined, is furthered by sentencing a non-homicide
juvenile offender with LWOP. 9
Like Roper, Graham observed that categorical rules have
flaws, but it confirmed the necessity of a categorical exclusion of
youth in these instances." The Court concluded, "[1]ife in prison
72. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 990 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 2008) and 556 U.S. 1120
(2008)).
73. The Court looked for both national and international consensus
surrounding juveniles sentenced to LWOP. Id. at 62, 80-81.
74. Id. at 62 ("Here, an examination of actual sentencing practices in
jurisdictions where the sentence in question is permitted by statute discloses a
consensus against its use.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 68-72 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) ("Because
juveniles' lack of maturity and undeveloped sense of responsibility.., often result
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions, they are less likely to take a
possible punishment into consideration when making decisions." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
77. Id. at 69. The Court, in its reasoning, asserted that "defendants who do not
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving
of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers." Id.
78. The Court spent some time analyzing the severity of LWOP sentences and
their similarities to death sentences. The Court also recognized that a juvenile
will, on average, serve a larger percentage of his life in prison than an adult
offender. Id. at 69-71.
79. Id. at 71 ("A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by
nature disproportionate to the offense."). See id. at 71-74 for the Court's analysis
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without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment
outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no
hope."81 Three factors ultimately drove the Court to its resolution:
penological theory, the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide
offenders, and the severity of the LWOP sentence. While the
Court conceded that the State is not required to guarantee
eventual freedom for a juvenile, it must provide defendants some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release. 3
C. An Individualized Approach to Sentencing: Miller
On June 25, 2012, the Court ruled on two companion cases,
both of which featured a 14-year-old who was convicted of murder
and sentenced to mandatory LWOP. 4  In each case, the
defendants objected to their punishments on Eighth Amendment
grounds, with the state supreme courts affirming each of their
convictions. 5  In crafting its decision, the Court examined two
lines of precedent: categorical bans on particular sentencing
practices for youth, 6 and the requirement of individualized
consideration before a death sentence.87
Miller acknowledged the conclusion present in both Roper
and Graham that children are "constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing."8 However, unlike in Graham
and Roper, the Court did not seek to "categorically bar a penalty
for a class of offenders or type of crime."9 Instead, Miller sought
to create a "certain process-considering an offender's youth and
attendant characteristics-before imposing a particular penalty."0
Justice Kagan explained in the majority opinion that, in both
Miller and Jackson, state law "'mandated that each juvenile die in
prison even if a judge or jury thought that [their] youth and its
attendant characteristics, along with the nature of [their] crime'
81. Id. at 79.
82. Id. at 74.
83. Id. at 75.
84. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
85. Id. at 2461-62.
86. Id. at 2463.
87. Id. at 2463-64 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)) (plurality opinion) and ) ("Here, the
confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory
[LWOP] sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment.").
88. Id. at 2464.




called for something other than a LWOP sentence.?' This
observation, combined with the analysis of the two aforementioned
lines of precedent, influenced the Court to hold that the Eighth
Amendment prevents a state from mandating LWOP sentences for
juveniles, and that individualized consideration needs to be given
to each juvenile offender before such a sentence. 2 As a result, the
Court issued a decision that shows how "youth matters for
purposes of meting out the law's most serious punishments." 3 The
Court ultimately resolved that "a judge or jury must have the
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles" and that mandatory
LWOP sentences for all juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. 4
D. Effects of Roper, Graham, and Miller
The rulings in Roper, Graham, and, especially, Miller created
some confusion among jurisdictions on how best to handle juvenile
sentencing practices to comport with these cases.5 At the time of
the Miller decision, seven states and the District of Columbia had
banned LWOP sentences for juveniles. 6 These seven states have
since been joined by five more states, aligning with the
"overwhelming international consensus" against such sentencing
practices. 7 The decision in Miller struck down laws in twenty-
eight states that required mandatory LWOP sentences for
individuals who were convicted of homicide offenses before the age
of eighteen. 8 In the two years since the Miller decision, legislative
responses have not been consistent. 99  While thirteen of the
twenty-eight states have passed compliance laws, "the minimum
time that must be served before parole review is still substantial,
91. loana Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between
Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 96 (2013)
(quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460).
92. Id. (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470).
93. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 2471.
94. Id. at 2475.
95. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme
Court Mandate on Life Without Parole 1 (2014), available at http:Ilsentencingproje
ct.org/doc/publications/jj-StateResponses to Miller.pdf.
96. Id. at 2 (these states include Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky,
Montana, New Mexico, and Oregon).
97. Since 2012, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming
have banned LWOP for juveniles. Four other states, Maine, New Jersey, New
York, and Vermont, do not ban LWOP sentences but have shown little inclination
to use the sentence in practice. Id.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id.
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ranging from [twenty-five] years (Delaware, North Carolina, and
Washington) to [forty] years (Nebraska and Texas).""1 ° Sentencing
consistency across jurisdictions is an important and valued
concept in our criminal system, and State v. Lyle provides an
avenue for each state to comport with the Supreme Court's
juvenile sentencing trilogy.
IV. Iowa's Implementation of Roper, Graham, and Miller
In State v. Lyle, the majority recognized and celebrated
Iowa's tendency to be ahead of the curve in matters "regarding
fundamental rights.""1  The Iowa Supreme Court provided an
interesting arena for analysis because its cruel and unusual
sentencing jurisprudence from the last decade has been so
robust. 102
A. A Juvenile Sentencing Trilogy of Its Own
In the immediate aftermath of Roper, Graham, and, later,
Miller, the Iowa Supreme Court decided three juvenile sentencing
cases: State v. Ragland, State v. Null, and State v. Pearson."3
These cases draw similar conclusions to the holdings in Roper,
Graham, and Miller, and create a solid framework for the State v.
Lyle decision.0
First, in Ragland, a juvenile offender tried as an adult
brought a post-conviction relief action claiming that his sentence
100. The other fifteen states have not passed any sort of compliance litigation.
Id.
101. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 387 (Iowa 2014) ("We also recognize that we
would abdicate our duty to interpret the Iowa Constitution if we relied exclusively
on the presence or absence of a national consensus regarding a certain punishment.
Iowans have generally enjoyed a greater degree of liberty and equality ... ").
102. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d
88 (Iowa 2013); State v. Ragland, 812 N.W.2d 654 (Iowa 2012); State v. Oliver, 812
N.W.2d 636 (Iowa 2012) (utilizing the test developed by the Court in Graham to
evaluate the constitutionality of a term-of-years sentence); State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding a defendant's enhanced sentence was
disproportionate to the crime and thus cruel and unusual).
103. 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013); 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013); 812 N.W.2d 654
(Iowa 2012).
104. Ragland, 812 N.W.2d at 659 (holding that "the court should not have
dismissed Ragland's post-conviction relief action concerning his claim that his
sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because the controlling
authority has changed since Ragland challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual
punishment in his original appeal"); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71, 74-75 (using a broad
interpretation of Miller to suggest that taking youth into consideration involves an
individualized analysis of culpability); Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 97 (vacating
"Pearson's sentence and remand the case to the district court for application of the
Miller standards as described in Null and this opinion").
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should be overturned in the wake of Roper and Graham."' The
district court dismissed his claim and the court of appeals
affirmed, holding that "the law of the case doctrine precludes the
court from revisiting [the sentence].",10' The law of the case
doctrine "represents the practice of courts to refuse to reconsider
what has once been decided." ' 7  The Iowa Supreme Court
ultimately held that, while the law of the case doctrine precludes
the offender from attacking his conviction for first-degree murder,
it does not preclude him for attacking his sentence on Eighth
Amendment grounds because the controlling law changed with
Roper and Graham."8
Fourteen months after the Miller decision, the Iowa Supreme
Court decided State v. Null and State v. Pearson on the same
day."°9 In Null, a juvenile was charged as an adult with first-
degree murder."' Prior to the hearing, the defendant entered into
a plea agreement with the State.1 Had he not taken the deal, he
would have been sentenced to a mandatory LWOP, as his crime
took place before the Court's ruling in Miller. 2 With the plea
deal, the defendant was sentenced to fifty years for second-degree
murder and to twenty-five years for first-degree robbery."' At the
sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that the only
discretion it possessed was whether to allow the defendant to
serve the sentences concurrently or consecutively."' The district
court ultimately decided to require that the sentences be served
consecutively, stating that "it had considered the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, [the defendant's] history and
characteristics, including his age and prior court interventions,
and the recommendations of both counsel."1 5 The defendant
appealed the decision in the wake of Miller, arguing that his
105. Ragland, 812 N.W.2d at 655.
106. Id. at 656.
107. Id. at 658 (quoting State v. Grosvenor, 402 N.W.2d, 402, 405 (Iowa 1987)).
108. Id. at 656. See id. at 656-58 for a detailed explanation of the facts.
109. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 88; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 41.
110. The defendant was sixteen years and ten months old at the time, which
meant that he was required to be charged as an adult. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 45. See
IOWA CODE § 232.8(1)(c) and § 707.2 (2009).
111. Id. The reason the defendant took the plea deal is "readily apparent-by
taking it he gained the opportunity to be released from prison on parole . Id.
at 46.
112. Id. See IOWA CODE § 702.2 and § 902.1.
113. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 45-46.
114. Id. at 46-47.
115. Id. at 47.
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sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.116
The Iowa Supreme Court first conceded that neither Roper,
Graham, nor Miller "involved a sentence for a lengthy term of
years" that was not a LWOP sentence.11 ' Also, at the time, the
court recognized that "there ha[d] been little development of state
constitutional law [in response to Miller]." 8 In the court's own
interpretation of Roper, Graham, and Miller, it concluded that a
lengthy sentence imposed on a juvenile is sufficient to "trigger
Miller-type protections" even thought it is not technically a LWOP
sentence." The court draws this conclusion through a broad
interpretation of Miller,1 2' determining that taking youth into
consideration means more than "a generalized notion of taking age
into consideration as a factor in sentencing"1 21 and that it requires
a detailed and individualized analysis of culpability and the
juvenile's ability to change.12 2  The court finally determined that
the individualized assessment outlined in Miller should, indeed,
apply to consecutive sentences and, as such, remanded the case
back to the trial court for appropriate sentencing.
12 3
Finally, in Pearson, a seventeen year old was convicted by a
jury of two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of first-
degree burglary.1 2 4 The district court sentenced the defendant to
serve concurrent sentences "for the convictions arising from each
transaction-one count of first-degree robbery and one count of
first-degree burglary-but ordered those two sentences to be
served consecutively. 25 The defendant received a total sentence
of fifty years and was ineligible for parole until she served thirty-
116. The defendant reached this conclusion by citing a National Vital Statistics
Report indicating that the life expectancy of a twenty-year-old black male is 51.7
years. Id. at 50-51.
117. Id. at 67.
118. Id. at 69.
119. Id. at 71 ("Even if lesser sentences than life without parole might be less
problematic, we do not regard the juvenile's potential future release in his or her
late sixties after a half century of incarceration sufficient to escape the rationales of
Graham or Miller.").
120. Id. at 72 ("We recognize that some courts have viewed Miller more
narrowly, holding that it applies only to mandatory sentences of life without
parole.").
121. Id. at 74.
122. Id. at 74-75.
123. Id. at 76 ("[T]his case must be remanded to the district court for
resentencing in light of the requirement of Miller that the district court consider all
that was said in Roper and its progeny about the distinctive qualities of youth.").




five years."6 The defendant appealed and argued her sentence
was cruel and unusual.127 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and the Iowa Supreme Court granted
128
review.
The court utilized the same analysis as it did in Null to
determine whether Miller was applicable to the sentence in
Pearson.12 ' The Pearson court determined that, in light of both
Miller and Null, "it should be relatively rare or uncommon that a
juvenile be sentenced to a lengthy prison term without the
possibility of parole for offenses like those involved in this case."3 '
The court concluded that the Eighth Amendment, and its
companion provision in the Iowa Constitution, requires "an
individualized sentencing hearing where... [a juvenile] is
effectively deprived of any chance of an earlier release and the
possibility of leading a more normal adult life." '31  The court
vacated the district court's sentence and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with Miller and Null.
1 2
B. State v. Lyle: Paving the Way for Complete
Individualization of Sentencing
On June 29, 2011, Andre Lyle, Jr. was convicted of robbery in
the second degree."' He was a seventeen-year-old high school
student when he committed the crime in 2010.134 Prior to the trial,
Lyle attempted to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court but
was unsuccessful. 5
Lyle grew up in Des Moines with little family support; he was
raised by his grandmother after his father was put in prison and
his mother threatened him with a knife. 13 ' His grandmother
permitted Lyle to smoke marijuana and he was frequently tardy or
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 94.
129. Id. at 95 ("[In Null] we explored in detail the contours of Miller, as well as
the Supreme Court's decisions in [Roper] and [Graham]. We need not repeat the
analysis here." (internal citations omitted)).
130. Id. at 96.
131. Id. at 96.
132. Id. at 97.
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absent from school.137 Lyle was sentenced before the district court
on his eighteenth birthday.138  After appearing in court for
sentencing, he received a term of incarceration in the state
corrections system not to exceed ten years. 9 Pursuant to statute,
the sentence was mandatory with a requirement for him to serve
seventy percent of the term before he was eligible for parole.
1 4
Lyle objected to the mandatory minimum sentence on the grounds
that it violated both the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment
and the Iowa Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment
clauses.1 4 ' The district court overruled Lyle's objection and the
court of appeals affirmed. 14 2 Lyle sought further review and the
Iowa Supreme Court granted certiorari, provided that the State
"submit additional briefing regarding whether the seventy percent
mandatory minimum of [Lyle's] ten-year sentence.., was
constitutional in light of [Ragland, Pearson, and Null]. '4  Chief
Justice Mark Cady wrote the opinion of the court with three other
justices concurring.14 4
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized that the "concept of
cruel and unusual punishment is 'not static.'1 45  The court
considered Lyle's challenge because "the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment 'is nothing less than the dignity' of
humankind ... [and] [t]his prohibition 'must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.'1 46  In turning to Lyle's contention that
mandatory minimums cannot be constitutionally applied to
juveniles, the court utilized a two-step inquiry:
[(1) Considering the] objective indicia of society's standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to
determine whether there is a national consensus against the
sentencing practice at issue [... and (2) Exercising the
137. Lyle had frequent contact with the police and first entered the juvenile
justice system at age twelve. Id. He was also involved in many criminal acts as a
teenager. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. See IOWA CODE § 711.3 (2011) ("Robbery in the second degree is a class
'C' felony."); Id. § 902.9(4) ("A class 'C' felon, not an habitual offender, shall be
confined no more than ten years ....").
140. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 381 (citing IOWA CODE § 902.12(5)).
141. Id. at 382.
142. After the appeal, Lyle "sought further review and asserted the decision of
the court of appeals was contrary to Miller." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 380, 404. The case also had two written dissenting opinions. Id. at
404, 408.
145. Id. at 384 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
146. Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
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Court's] own independent judgment guided by the standards
elaborated by controlling precedents and by our own
understanding and interpretation of the Iowa Constitution's
text, history, meaning, and purpose.
147
As to the first prong, the court first recognized that no other
court in the nation has come to the conclusion that banning
mandatory minimum sentencing is consistent with Roper,
Graham, and Miller.1 48 However, the court did not take this as a
dispositive reason to uphold Lyle's conviction.1 4  The court also
realized that "the statutory recognition of the need for some
discretion when sentencing juveniles is consistent with [its]
overall approach in the past in dealing with juveniles." ' Finally,
the court declared that, even if a consensus among states does not
currently exist, one to eliminate mandatory minimum sentences is
certainly building in Iowa."'
Finding the first prong of analysis sufficiently satisfied, the
court continued to its second prong.5 With regards to the second
prong of analysis, the court outlined the history of juvenile
sentencing practices.5 From their timeline, the court concluded,
"[tihis history is particularly salient given the categorical nature
of Lyle's challenge. It reveals children and juveniles have been
viewed as constitutionally different from adults in this country for
more than a century. 1 4  The court also acknowledged that the
holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller kept several questions
open, including the determination of to what extent a mandatory
147. Id. at 386 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) and
Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
148. Id. at 386-87. See Alex Dutton, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing
Reform: Enforcing Miller's Individualized Sentencing Requirement Beyond the
JLWOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 173, 195 (2013); Martin
Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile's Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 494 & n.267 (2012) (arguing that adult
mandatory sentencing schemes cannot automatically be imposed on juveniles
without prosecutors providing that the juvenile deserves the sentence).
149. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 387. The court looks also to the Iowa legislature,
acknowledging that it had already taken steps toward removing mandatory
sentences for juveniles in most cases and that deference must be given when they
give sentencing guidance. Id. at 387-88 (citing 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, §14 (codified
at IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.5(14) (2014).
150. Id. at 388. The case provides a substantial list of provisions in the juvenile
justice chapter of the Iowa Code that gives courts such discretion.
151. Id. at 389.
152. Id. at 390 ("We must decide if the mandatory minimum sentence for a
youthful offender violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in light of its
text, meaning, purpose, and history.").
153. Id. See id. at 390-97.
154. Id. at 390.
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minimum sentence can automatically be imposed on a juvenile in
adult court. 155 Recognizing, again, that the United States Supreme
Court considers the age of a child as relevant to an Eighth
Amendment determination, the court concluded "that the
sentencing of juveniles according to statutorily required
mandatory minimums does not adequately serve the legitimate
penological objectives in light of the child's categorically
diminished culpability. 1  As an alternative to mandatory
minimum sentences, the court advocated for the lower courts to
make an individualized judgment, "consider[ing] youth and its
attendant circumstances as a mitigating factor . .,,157 The court
cites to Miller to provide specific factors the lower courts should
consider to make such individualized judgments. Ultimately,
the court vacated Lyle's sentence and remanded his case back to
the district court for further proceedings.
1 5 9
V. The Need for Further Reform: Stopping Mandatory
Minimum Sentences for Juveniles
A. The Case for Abolishing Mandatory Minimum Sentences
for All Juveniles
The Iowa Supreme Court was correct in determining that the
abolishment of mandatory minimum sentences is a correct
application of Roper, Graham, and Miller, and that they offend our
understanding of juveniles in light of that jurisprudence. As the
Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller repeatedly affirms, children
are constitutionally different from adults.6  The Court
emphasized that children have diminished culpability, have a
"lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,
16 1
and possess an underdeveloped character (meaning his or her
actions are "less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity),"6 2
155. Id. at 386 (quoting State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 66-67 (Iowa 2013)).
156. Id. at 398.
157. Id. at 404 ("[Jludges will do what they have taken an oath to do. They will
apply the law fairly and impartially, without fear. They will sentence those
juvenile offenders to the maximum sentence if warranted and to a lesser
sentence ... if warranted.").
158. Id. at n.10.
159. Id. at 404.
160. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) ("Roper and Graham establish that
children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.").
161. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).




which make it imperative for courts to consider them differently
for criminal sentencing purposes."' Mandatory minimum
sentences do not require the courts to take this "youth difference"
into account, instead providing automatic punishment starting
points for both adult and juvenile offenders. Abolishing
mandatory minimum sentences is an appropriate extension of
Roper, Graham, and Miller: it combines the categorical treatment
of youth that is present in Roper and Graham with the
individualized sentencing mandate of Miller to create a system
that takes into account the specific story of each juvenile,
regardless of the offense. A completely individualized scheme
forces the sentencer to "... . look[] behind the label of the crime
into the details of the particular offense and the individual
circumstances of the child., 1 4 Based on what we currently know
about juvenile brain development.. and the challenges for many
juveniles in the adult criminal system (prevalence of mental
illness, lack of access to educational resources, diminished family
support)," sentencing practices need to conform to those laid out
in State v. Lyle.
The Court relied both on self-proclaimed "common sense" and
actual science to substantiate its "children are different"
conclusion."' Scientists and psychologists are able to demonstrate
that children and adolescents are less mature and rational than
their adult counterparts.1 "8 One of the last parts of the brain to
163. Id. at 2466 ("[T]he mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the
sentencer from taking account of these central considerations."). See also Tamera
Wong, Adolescent Minds, Adult Crimes: Assessing a Juvenile's Mental Health and
Capacity to Stand Trial, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 163, 165 (2002) ("In an
increasingly penal environment, the unique characteristics of young
offenders ... must be recognized to determine if the criminal justice environment
can successfully solve the problem of juvenile crime.").
164. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 400-01.
165. See Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, ABA (2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjustjuvjus/Adolescence.pdf ("The evidence
now is strong that the brain does not cease to mature until the early 20s in those
relevant parts that govern impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight
of consequences, and other characteristics that make people morally culpable.")
[hereinafter Brain Development and Legal Culpability].
166. See Wong, supra note 163, at 171-72.
167. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65 (2012) (citing Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 570 (2005));
see also Feld, supra note 32, at 277 (citing Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific
Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 396 (2006)).
168. See Nick Straley, Miller's Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal
Sentences for Children, 89 WASH L. REV. 963, 970-71 (2014) ("Adolescents'
behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains ... the
prefrontal cortex remains structurally immature until early adulthood, around the
mid-twenties."). See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the
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develop is the pre-frontal cortex, the portion of the brain that
controls advanced functions, including prioritizing thoughts,
anticipating consequences, and controlling impulses.6 Because
the juvenile mind is not yet fully developed, there is a greater
potential for rehabilitation and change.1 0 Mandatory minimums
do not take the brain development of juveniles into account, rather
they are legislative constructs designed for punishing adult
offenders.
Apart from brain development and culpability, juvenile
offenders face challenges that further complicate the question of
their culpability. 71 First, there is evidence to show that a high
percentage of juvenile offenders suffer from some type of
emotional, behavioral, or mental disorder. 172 There is also
evidence to support the contention that many juveniles in the
criminal system who need treatment for some type of behavioral,
emotional, or mental illness do not receive it."3 Both society and
the courts recognize that those with mental illness "may be
incapable of making rational choices, rendering them less culpable
and therefore less deserving of punishment than other
offenders.""1 4  Second, many juvenile offenders are products of a
Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 115, 119 (2007); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003).
169. Brain Development and Legal Culpability, supra note 165.
170. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 ("From a moral standpoint, it would be misguided to
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for greater possibility exists
that minor's character deficiencies will be reformed.").
171. See Jennifer A. Rosenblatt et al., Criminal Behavior and Emotional
Disorder: Comparing Youth Served by the Mental Health and Juvenile Justice
Systems, 27 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 227 (2000); Linda A. Teplin et al.,
Detecting Mental Disorder in Juvenile Detainees: Who Receives Services, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1173 (2005); Wong, supra note 163, at 165-66.
172. See Rosenblatt, supra note 171, at 228 (concluding that a high percentage of
juvenile offenders exhibit symptoms commonly associated with emotional
difficulties); Teplin, supra note 171, at 1173 ("Epidemiological studies estimate that
between two thirds and three quarters of detained youths have 1 or more
psychiatric disorders."); Wong, supra note 163, at 165-66.
173. Teplin, supra note 171, at 1176.
174. Vanessa L. Kolbe, A Proposed Bar to Transferring Juveniles with Mental
Illness to Criminal Court: Let the Punishment Fit the Culpability, 14 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 418, 434 (2007); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 305, 321 (2002)
(holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional for a "mentally retarded"
defendant). While the Supreme Court noted that "[mientally retarded persons
frequently know the difference between right and wrong," it also held in Atkins
that, "by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from




tempestuous home life."' Negative parental involvement or
parental noninvolvement directly impacts a youth's development
and is a possible contributing factor to juvenile delinquency. 76
Because youths' brains are so impressionable, the existence of "a
turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, [or] of
severe emotional disturbance is particularly relevant.
'1 7 7
Mandatory minimums force the courts to apply a
standardized sentence to juveniles based on the crime, not based
on their culpability or other outside factors that have a
disproportionate effect on juveniles. Even within the juvenile
population, mandatory minimum sentences do not take into
account the vast differences between each offender in the criminal
system.1 7 ' The Court recognized the issue with mandatory
sentences in its holding in Miller:
Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the
wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.
Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the same
sentence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old,
the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable
household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one. And
still worse, each juvenile ... will receive the same sentences
as the vast majority of adults committing
similar ... offenses-but really, as Graham noted, a greater
sentence than those adults will serve.17
The Court also notes in Miller that "none of what [Graham]
said about children-about their distinctive (and transitory)
mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is crime-
175. Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a National
Survey, SENT'G PROJECT (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publ
ications/jjTheLives of Juvenile Lifers.pdf.
176. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, FAMILY LIFE AND DELINQUENCE AND CRIME: A POLICYMAKERS' GUIDE
TO THE LITERATURE (1993), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization
/140517NCJRS.pdf.
177. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). The Court in Eddings also
recognized that youth "is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage." Id. (citing THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCE AND YOUTH CRIME (1967)).
178. See Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice,
67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1156 (2014) ("While such sentences may help to achieve the
goal of equal punishment for those who commit identical offenses, they do so at the
sacrifice of the individualization that ought also to be part of so personal a
proceeding as sentencing.").
179. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467-68 (2012) (citing Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)).
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specific.""18 While Roper, Graham, and Miller all focus on the most
severe punishments available to courts, mandatory minimums
offend the same principles that these cases sought to protect. The
key term, in light of the analysis in Roper, Graham, and Miller, is
"mandatory:""' these types of sentences do not allow courts to
consider the characteristics of youth, a consideration deemed
crucial by the Supreme Court. As concluded in Graham and
reiterated in Miller, juvenile sentences should be shaped by
"demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" of the defendant.
1 2
These mandatory minimum sentences do not allow for this type of
consideration.
The prevalence of juveniles in the adult criminal system is a
serious problem, only exacerbated by mandatory minimum
sentences. "On any given day, nearly 7500 young people are
locked up in adult jails.""' 3 Youth in adult prison facilities are at a
high risk for sexual victimization and violence."4 Mandatory
minimum sentences place juveniles in a potentially precarious
situation without fully examining the mitigating factors of youth.
These sentences attempt to fit juveniles into adult boxes, sending
them off to a dangerous environment without allowing for the
considerations mandated by the Court.
15
B. Without Mandatory Minimum Sentences, How Do Courts
Determine Juvenile Sentences?
Without a mandatory minimum sentence-specific guideline to
follow, courts should conduct an individualized analysis for each
180. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 395 (2014) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2465) (internal citations omitted).
181. Dutton, supra note 148, at 195 ("When challenging mandatory minimums
for juveniles, it is not the sentence itself that is at issue, rather, how it is
imposed.").
182. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 ("A State is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State
must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.").
183. Liz Ryan, Youth in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
1167, 1170 (2014).
184. Id. at 1171 (citing Allen J. Beck, Paige M. Harrison & Devon B. Adams,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL
AUTHORITIES, 2006, at 35 (Carolyn Williams ed., 2007), available at http://www.bjs.
gov/contentlpub/pdf/svrca06.pdf) ("According to ... the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
youth under the age of eighteen represented 21% of all substantiated victims of
inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jails in 2005, and 13% in 2006-surprisingly
high considering that only 1% of jail inmates are juveniles.").
185. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 401 ("There is no other area of the law in which our
laws write off children based only on a category of conduct without considering all
background facts and circumstances.").
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defendant, similar to that in Miller and Lyle."' This suggested list
of factors should not be construed as exhaustive, with courts
recognizing that "[tihe broad ways in which a juvenile offender's
culpability can be reduced favor the admission of an equally broad
range of mitigating evidence."1" Factors that courts should
implement include:
(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful
behavior, such as 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences'; (2) the particular 'family
and home environment' that surround the youth; (3) the
circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances
relating to youth that may have played a role in the
commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful
offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and (5)
the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.
Such factors "carr[y] with [them] the advantage of simultaneously
being more flexible and responsive to the demands of juveniles
than outright prohibition of a particular penalty while also
providing real and substantial protection for the offender's right to
be sentenced accurately according to their culpability .... 189
An individualized sentence does not necessarily mean a short
sentence.19 The holding in Lyle allows judges to "sentence those
juvenile offenders to the maximum sentence if warranted and to a
lesser sentence providing for parole if warranted."19 1 The only
requirement is that "states must adopt sentencing schemes that
allow for the consideration of age and the mitigating
circumstances that accompany it. '19'2
C. Addressing Critiques to State v. Lyle
In evaluating the use of a completely individualized
sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders, some critics are skeptical
of the heavy reliance on the "children are different" principle.193 In
186. See id. at 404 n.10 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012)).
187. Sara E. Fiorillo, Mitigating After Miller: Legislative Considerations and
Remedies for the Future of Juvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2095, 2123 (2013).
188. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468); see also
State v. Null, 835 N.W.2d 41, 74-75 (Iowa 2013); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88,
95-96 (Iowa 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 654, 654 (Iowa 2012).
189. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 386.
190. Id. at 403 ("It is important to be mindful that the holding in this case does
not prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time
identified by the legislature for the crime committed ... .
191. Id.
192. Fiorillo, supra note 187, at 2123.
193. Sara L. Ochs, Miller v. Alabama: The Supreme Court's Lenient Approach to
Our Nation's Juvenile Murderers, 58 LOy. L. REV. 1073, 1091 (2012) ("Despite [the
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State v. Lyle, Justice Waterman, in his dissent, explicitly criticized
the court for using juvenile brain development research in crafting
its decision, arguing that it does not clearly justify the bright-line
rule abolishing mandatory minimum sentences for all offenders
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under the age of eighteen.
Both Justice Waterman and Justice Zager's dissents
condemn the majority's decision for producing "dramatic real-
world consequences. 1 First, they explain that the individualized
sentencing hearings advocated for by the majority will both create
an undue burden on the courts and will "reopen the wounds of the
victims and their families."1 6 Second, the dissenting justices
express concern that some violent offenders will be released
earlier than they would have been under a mandatory minimum
sentence, creating the possibility that "[s]ome of these violent
felons will commit new crimes." 7 The justices, instead, stress the
importance of giving deference to the legislature."8
Another major critique of an individualized sentencing
scheme for juveniles is "the substantial resources it would require
and the strain it would place on an already overworked court
system." ' While it is true that implementing any new policy in
the courts will be a heavy investment of time and resources,
creating an individualized sentencing policy now will "prevent
costs from later challenges down the road ... [as] the future
landscape of [the] Eighth Amendment [in the wake of Miller] is far
from certain., 211 Scholars, too, recognize this uncertainty.21  As
Court's argument], there is significant evidence to show that adolescents that
commit savage murders possess the same culpability as their adult criminal
counterparts.") (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
194. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 405 ("Will the majority stop here? Under the majority's
reasoning, if the teen brain is still evolving, what about nineteen-year olds? If the
brain is still maturing into the mid-20s, why not prohibit mandatory minimum
sentences for any offender under age twenty-six?") (Waterman, J., dissenting). But
see Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 ("The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at
which death eligibility ought to rest.").
195. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 406.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 405 ("As judges, we do not have a monopoly on wisdom. Our
legislators raise teenagers too. Courts traditionally give broad deference to
legislative sentencing policy judgments.") (citing State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636,
650 (Iowa 2012)) (Waterman, J., dissenting).
199. Fiorillo, supra note 187, at 2127 (citing People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 715
(Mich. App. 2012); Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)).
200. Id. at 2127 (citing Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth
Amendment's Uncertain Future, 27 CRIM. JUST. 19, 19-20 (2013)).
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Douglas A. Berman °2 writes, "[plut simply, due to distinct
interpretive difficulties, unique institutional pressures, high
stakes for states and individuals, and the always looming reality
that any rulings in favor of a defendant will engender a flood of
follow-up litigation, the Eighth Amendment presents a perfect
storm of challenges for constitutional adjudication.""3  Adopting
an across-the-board individualization of juvenile sentencing will
insulate the courts from further challenges under Miller.
VI. Conclusion
The Iowa Supreme Court correctly abolished mandatory
minimum sentences for juveniles in Iowa following the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller.
Mandatory minimum sentences are an inappropriate way to
sentence juveniles in light of these three decisions because they
fail to take into account the differences between youth and adults,
something the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller determined
was necessary. Instead of legislatively created mandatory
sentencing schemes, the courts should perform an individualized
assessment of each juvenile, as advocated for in Miller and
implicated in Lyle. By replacing mandatory minimum sentences
with an individualized sentencing hearing for each juvenile
offender, Lyle adequately allows the court to consider a juvenile's
age, culpability, and other factors to determine an appropriate
sentence.
201. See Berman, supra note 200; William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment
Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053 (2013) (explaining that the Court's holding in
Miller opens up discussions about the appropriate application of the Eighth
Amendment to other groups of individuals); Richard S. Frase, What's "Different"
(Enough) in Eighth Amendment Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 35 (2013)
("Perhaps the Graham and Miller decisions have little or no implications for adult
sentencing because 'children are constitutionally different.' Then again, perhaps
these cases mark the beginning of a pendulum swing back toward at least some
degree of Eighth Amendment regulation of extreme adult prison sentences.").
202. Berman is the Robert J. Watkins/Proctor & Gamble Professor of Law at The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
203. Berman, supra note 200, at 24 ("Moreover, if and whenever the Supreme
Court even suggests that a particular punishment may be suspect under the
Eighth Amendment, many defendants will be quick to flock to the courts with
claims that their punishments are comparable and thus also constitutionally
problematic."). By creating this type of all-encompassing standard, the Iowa court
is creating a buffer from these types of potential challenges.
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